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THE ETHICS OF BLUFFING: THE EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES ON
PERCEIVED ETHICALITY AND BLUFFING BEHAVIOR
G. Stoney Alder, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Rebecca M. Guidice, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Although researchers have debated the ethicality of bluffing in business, little research has examined individuals’
attitudes and beliefs towards bluffing and how characteristics of the individual influence such perceptions and subsequent
behavior. We consider this issue by examining how individuals’ ethical orientation influences their perceptions of the
ethicality of bluffing select organizational stakeholders, their willingness to bluff, and their actual bluffing behavior.
Results indicate that ethical orientation exerts direct effects on the perceived ethicality of bluffing and indirect effects on
individuals’ reported willingness to engage in this misleading form of communication as well as their actual bluffing
behavior. Implications for research and practice are discussed.
Although bluffing, as a form of misleading
communication, is a familiar practice to many individuals,
groups, and organizations, there is little agreement as to its
ethicality. Indeed, academicians have debated and
philosophized on the ethicality of bluffing in business for
decades (e.g., Allhoff, 2003; Carr, 1968; Lewicki and
Robinson, 1998). Despite these discussions, there is a
paucity of research that examines individuals’ attitudes and
beliefs towards bluffing and how characteristics of the
individual may influence such perceptions. As a result, we
know little about how individual differences influence
employees’ perceptions of and willingness to mislead
others in their communications. This line of research is
important for at least two reasons. First, from a theory and
research perspective, a complete understanding of bluffing
requires full consideration of the variables that may be
responsible for individuals’ reactions to bluffing as well as
their willingness to do so themselves. To the extent that
individual differences affect perceptions of and attitudes
toward bluffing, any theoretical model that omits individual
differences is incomplete. Second, this avenue of research
will similarly contribute to the business ethics literature by
enhancing our understanding of the effect individual
difference variables have on individuals’ attitudes,
intentions, and behaviors in ethical “gray” areas.
Our paper seeks to shed light on this issue by
examining how individuals’ ethical orientation (Brady,
1985, 1990) influences their judgments on the ethicality of
bluffing various organizational stakeholders, their
willingness to so, and ultimately, their bluffing behavior in
a competitive context. Simply put, the research questions
that we hope to answer are these; does ethical orientation
help predict different views on the practice of bluffing and
how do those views influence individuals’ intention to and
engagement in bluffing? We begin by first examining the
nature and prevalence of business related bluffing and
subsequently review existing research on bluffing as related
to our study.

PART 1: THEORY & HYPOTHESES
Bluffing In and By Organizations
Bluffing is the practice of intentionally communicating
a misleading signal of intended action with the expectation
that its recipient(s) interpret and react as if the
communication were truthful (Guidice et al., 2009). Ample
evidence exists of instances where parties have used this
type of communication in an attempt to achieve a superior
position over competitors or to reach an optimal agreement
in important negotiations (e.g., Bayus et al., 2001; Heil and
Langvardt, 1994). For example, Coke and Pepsi developed
a brief relationship with Holland Sweetener, a foreign
supplier of artificial sweetener, which they subsequently
used as a tool in negotiations with their existing supplier,
Monsanto. Monsonto was led to believe that if they did not
reduce the price of their sweetener, these two major soda
manufactures would switch suppliers (Brandenburger and
Nalebuff, 1996). Intel publically toyed with the idea of
relocating its Oregon operations until receiving state tax
concessions that then allowed the company to better invest
its resources in the region’s people and property (Sheketoff,
2005). Kabi and Genentech used decoy patents to mislead
their rivals into believing research was being conducted on
multiple processes; the goal of which was to keep rivals
guessing as to what medical breakthrough the alliance was
actually pursuing (McKelvey, 1996). North Korea leader,
Kim Jong II, claimed to have the nuclear weapons needed
to prevent outside interference in the country’s functioning
and ideology. Whether government officials were bluffing
was not entirely known, but given the potential
consequences if true, the threat gave the regime a temporary
advantage in negotiations with foreign agencies with which
they had economic or political ties (Herman, 2005).
Bluffing Research
While signals can be a useful form of communication
(Milewicz and Herbig, 1997; Porter, 1980), some signals
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Allhoff (2003) used a role differentiated perspective to
make the argument that attitudes on the legitimacy of
bluffing in business is context specific and thus, is likely to
be viewed favorably when the parties involved, based on
their role in business, endorse the practice.
We add to this growing body of research the
proposition that individual differences may also help
predict judgments of the ethicality of bluffing. That is,
although the content, target, and context of misleading
communication are clearly important as evidenced by
existing research, we suggest that they are not the exclusive
determinants of individuals’ evaluations of bluffing. Some
individuals may consider a given communication event
more or less ethical than other individuals consider the
same communication aimed at the same target, and this
difference may be best explained by considering
characteristics of the individual. Indeed, a long line of
research in organizational behavior indicates that individual
differences exert important influences on individuals’
perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. Ethics theory and
research similarly suggests an important role for a number
of individual variables, including a person’s stage of moral
development (Ferrell et al., 1989; Kohlberg, 1984; Rest,
1986; Sparks and Merenski, 2000). Despite this, it is
noteworthy that research has generally excluded
consideration of the effect individual differences may have
on our attitudes and beliefs toward bluffing.
This paper seeks to address this important gap in the
literature by examining individual ethical predispositions
relating to formalist (rules-based) and utilitarian (resultsbased) ethical decision making. We propose that different
ethical orientations will lead to different individual
assessments of the ethicality of bluffing different entities
and varied degrees of willingness to use this form of
misleading communication. Figure 1 depicts the
relationships that will be examined in the current study.

can be disingenuous, containing announcements that the
sender has no intention of acting upon immediately, if ever.
Indeed, as suggested in the previous section, bluffing can be
strategically beneficial (McNeilly, 1996) through its ability
to convey important information to key stakeholders and/or
provide the bluffer with valuable knowledge based on
recipients’ reactions to the announcement. Given its
widespread use, it is noteworthy that the practice of bluffing
has, apart from academic discourse in business ethics and
negotiations, been largely under-investigated. Among a
variety of issues worthy of continued examination is the
extent to which individuals consider the practice ethical or
unethical and what variables help differentiate those views.
Also missing in the literature is a definitive answer as to
how those views influence individuals’ intention to and
subsequent engagement in bluffing.
Perhaps motivated by the prevalence of bluffing and
other misleading communication in business, researchers
and philosophers have long debated its ethicality. On the
one hand, Eliashberg et al., (1996) argued that it is an
unacceptable practice and Lewicki and Robinson (1998,
p.666) considered it to be an objectionable form of lying
that serves “to misinform the opponent, to eliminate or
obscure the opponent’s choice alternatives, or to manipulate
the perceived costs and benefits of particular options that
the opponent may wish to pursue”. In contrast, advocates of
bluffing contend that bluffing is acceptable and ethical
(Allhoff, 2003). Carson (1993) indicates that since there is
no warrantability for truth with bluffing, the terms lying and
bluffing cannot be considered synonymous. Carr (1968)
argued that bluffing may simply be an unspoken rule of the
game.” Amidst these two opposing positions is the belief
that bluffing is an ethically neutral behavior (Anton, 1990).
Given these varied perspectives, it is clear that the ethicality
of bluffing is less than straightforward and sits on the
ethical edge.
Based on existing ambiguity, there is reason to believe
that attitudes toward bluffing may not be fixed, but rather
vary based on a number of variables. One such factor may
be the severity and legality of the misleading
communication. Unquestionably, few would argue that the
accounting manipulations receiving widespread attention in
today’s press constitute an unethical business practice. Of
interest in this study, however, is the relatively large gray
area in which it is less clear where the line between
ethicality and unethicality may be drawn and where
additional factors besides severity or legality apply to help
explain differing judgments of ethicality.
Another potential determinant of ethical attitudes
towards different forms of misleading communication
including bluffs is the target of the act (Ross and Robertson,
2000). Guidice and colleagues (2009) found that decision
makers’ views on the ethicality of bluffing differed
depending on the entity under consideration (e.g.
individuals were most lenient in their judgments of
ethicality when the recipient of the bluff is a competitor).

Ethical Orientation
Classifying how individuals interpret ethical situations
by identifying their ethical orientation has occupied ethical
scholars for some time. Ethical orientation is an
individual’s predisposition to rely on a certain pattern of
reasoning when evaluating ethical issues. One well-known
distinction differentiates between formalist and utilitarian
reasoning (Brady, 1985, 1990). Formalism (often associated
with Kantian ethics) and utilitarianism (often associated
with Bentham and Mills) parallel deontology and teleology
respectively (Brady, 1990), which Kohlberg (1984, p. 579)
suggested are "the two major ethical principles." Nozick
(1981, p. 494) argued that all of substantive ethics has been
fitted or poured into these two powerful and appealing
molds. Brady and Wheeler (1996) similarly concluded that
the distinction between formalism and utilitarianism may be
the most important distinction in ethical theory.
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FIGURE 1
Theoretical Relationship Between Ethical Predisposition, Perceived Instrumentality, Perceived Ethicality, Pressure,
and Bluffing Behavior
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Research indicates employees’ ethical orientations may
influence their interpretations of and attitudes towards
organization-based procedures and practices. For example,
Reynolds (2006) found evidence suggesting that formalism
and utilitarianism provide patterns by which organizational
information is processed and thereby serve as guides for
individuals’ attention. Consistent with this logic, Alder and
colleagues (Alder et al., 2007; Alder et al., 2008) found that
ethical orientation affects employees’ judgments of the
appropriateness and usefulness of potentially invasive
human resource programs (i.e., internet monitoring, drug
testing, and background checks). Our study extends this
research by examining the effect ethical orientation has on
individuals’ assessments of the ethicality of bluffing and on
their willingness do so.

As a personal predisposition, formalists are considered
past oriented; relying on a set of rules, principles, or
standards for guiding behavior (Brady, 1985; Reynolds,
2006). According to formalists, actions are ethical or not to
the extent that they adhere to these rules, principles, or
standards irrespective of their outcome. In contrast,
utilitarians are future oriented; evaluating the ethicality of
actions in terms of their expected consequences or results
(Brady, 1985; Reynolds, 2006). Rather than look for some
inherent morality to determine if a given action is ethical or
not, utilitarians consider actions to be ethical if they
produce the greatest possible outcome.
Traditionally, formalism and utilitarianism were
viewed as opposite ends of a single ethical continuum such
that stronger tendencies toward one implied weaker
tendencies toward the other. More recently, research
indicates that instead, they represent two independent
dimensions of an individual's ethical predisposition. That is,
individuals may prefer one or both - and each to a greater or
lesser degree - when reasoning through ethical situations
(Brady, 1990; Brady and Wheeler, 1996; Schminke and
Wells, 1999).

Ethical Orientation and Bluffing
Formalists focus on principles when deciding what is
morally right and are less concerned with the outcome of an
act in making ethical determinations. For formalists, acts
are right in and of themselves regardless of the outcomes
they lead to. When assessing various employee behaviors,
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particular, he suggested that signals, such as
preannouncements, be used to create uncertainty or
otherwise manipulate competitors’ anticipated moves.
Given utilitarians’ focus on effectiveness we would expect
high utilitarians to view bluffing more favorably than low
utilitarians.

including business related bluffing, formalists should
therefore consider the extent to which doing so violates or
adheres to their ethical principles. A number of
philosophers and ethical theorists have concluded that the
central issue in ethics involves rights and duties (Sumner,
2000). This approach maintains that the ethical act or
decision is the one that recognizes and respects the rights of
others and the duties that those rights impose on the actor.
Among the most often cited rights is the right to be told the
truth.
If individuals have the right to be told the truth, then
individuals sending signals or other forms of
communication have a concomitant duty to not tell a lie.
Lewicki (1983) defined lying as “any intentionally
deceptive message which is stated”. Lewicki and Robinson
(1998) propose that dishonesty in negotiation is primarily
concerned with problems of lying and truth telling. To the
extent that bluffing is synonymous with lying, it violates
actors’ duty to avoid lying. However, as described above,
there is considerable debate in the literature as to whether or
not bluffing is synonymous with lying (see Carson, 1993;
Lewicki and Robinson, 1998). As such, it appears bluffing
may lie in a gray zone on the continuum from truth telling
to lying. We would expect that high formalists, with their
focus on moral rules, would be more sensitive to this gray
zone than low formalists. As a result, high formalists will
likely consider bluffing counter to their ethical guidelines
and therefore unethical regardless of the non-moral
outcomes it generates.

Hypothesis 2: Ethical utilitarianism will be
positively related to individuals’ perceptions of the
ethicality of bluffing competitors and other
organizational stakeholders.
Ethics is an important concern for society, businesses,
and most individuals. Indeed, nine out of ten large
corporations have a code of ethics in place (Murphy, 1995).
The primary objectives of most corporate ethics training
programs is developing in employees an awareness of what
constitutes ethical issues and providing employees with
practical decision making models (Harrington, 1991). These
foci indicate there is an implicit assumption that employees
already care about ethics and they simply need help in
making better ethical judgments. All else being equal, we
therefore expect individuals’ perception of the ethicality of
bluffing to be an important determinant of their willingness
to engage in such behavior. This belief is also supported by
the theory of planned behavior wherein it is suggested that
attitudes influence behavioral intentions (Ajzen & Fishbein,
1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Consistent with this logic,
Guidice et al. (2009) found that decision makers that view
competitor bluffing as more ethical (less unethical) were
more willing to engage in bluffing. We expect the same
relationship to hold for not only competitors, but also other
targets of misleading communication and therefore predict:

Hypothesis 1: Ethical formalism will be negatively
related to individuals’ perceptions of the ethicality
of bluffing business stakeholders.

Hypothesis 3: Perceived ethicality will mediate the
relationship between individuals’ ethical
orientation and their willingness to bluff
competitors and other organizational stakeholders.

In contrast, utilitarians focus on outcomes rather
principles when assessing the ethicality of actions and
decisions. For these individuals, the focus is on whether or
not the action or decision will be effective at accomplishing
the goal they were designed to pursue. Thus, the issue of
effectiveness should be highly salient for utilitarians when
assessing the ethicality of bluffing. In this context, ethical
judgments may boil down to weighing the non-moral gains
and losses that will accrue to the various stakeholders as a
result of the bluff. Consequently, for utilitarians, providing
seemingly innocuous misleading information to a
competitor or other organizational stakeholder may be
deemed appropriate if it leads to valuable outcomes such as
a vital sale.
A number of researchers indicate that bluffing is an
important ingredient for organizational effectiveness. Zahra
(1994) found that executives often justify their competitive
practices on the grounds that competition is similar to war,
which subsequently makes acts that maintain or improve
one’s position in the marketplace permissible. D’Aveni
(1994; 1995) argued that signaling was an essential tool for
fending off rivals in intensely competitive markets. In

METHOD
We tested our hypotheses with a study that we detail in
two parts. In part one, forty first-year MBA students and
sixty-seven senior undergraduate business students enrolled
in a major Southwestern university completed a survey that
collected demographic information, formalist and utilitarian
ethical orientations, and attitudes and beliefs toward
bluffing. Participants received extra course credit for their
participation. Analysis revealed no significant differences
in demographics or bluffing behavior (explained in part two
of the study) between MBA and undergraduates; therefore
their data was combined in our analyses. Fifty-five percent
of the participants were female. The average age of
respondents was 26.5 years. Ninety-seven percent reported
having work experience, with an average of eight years.
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variety of demographic variables including age, gender, and
culture. For instance, it has been suggested that older
individuals and women may have higher ethical standards
than younger individuals and men (e.g., Dawson, 1997;
Peterson, Rhoads, and Vaught, 2001). Thus, we controlled
for participants’ age, gender, and citizenship in all analyses
prior to adding other variables in our regression models.

Fifty-four percent had managerial experience, with an
average of two years.
Measures
Ethical Orientation
The character traits version of the Measure of Ethical
Viewpoints is an alternative measure of the relative strength
of participants’ utilitarian and formalist ethical orientations
(Brady and Wheeler, 1996). Developed as a pencil-andpaper test for ethical predisposition, this instrument lists
twenty character traits (e.g., effective, honest, results
oriented, law-abiding) that subjects rate on a seven-point
scale (1 = not important to me, 7 = very important to me)
according to their personal judgment of the trait’s
importance. For consistency with the rest of the survey, we
utilized a five point scale rather than Brady and Wheeler’s
(1996) seven point scale.
Brady and Wheeler (1996) report factor analytic results
revealing two major factors in this instrument. Factor 1,
utilitarianism, included the traits of innovative, resourceful,
effective, influential, results-oriented, productive, and a
winner. Factor 2, formalism, included the traits of
principled, dependable, trustworthy, honest, noted for
integrity, and law-abiding. Reliabilities for the two scales in
their sample were 0.75 and 0.86, respectively. Consistent
with prior studies, we calculated a utilitarian score and a
formalist score for each participant by averaging the
responses to the items belonging to each scale.
Utilitarianism scores ranged from 2.3 to 5.0 with a mean of
4.0 (alpha = .81) and formalism scores ranged from 2.8 to
5.0 with a mean of 4.5 (alpha = .75).

RESULTS
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and
intercorrelations for the variables described above.
There has been discussion in the literature about the
appropriate method for testing mediation. MacKinnon,
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, and Sheets (2002) conducted a
Monte Carlo simulation to compare 14 methods to test
mediation. Results indicate that the widely used method
proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) has Type I error rates
that are too small in all conditions and have very lower
power, unless the effect or sample size is large. The authors
suggested that an indirect effects approach better evaluates
the mediation relationship (see also Collins et al., 1998).
Specifically, they argued that in contrast to the Baron and
Kenny approach, the test of joint significance provides the
best balance of Type I error and statistical power and
therefore they “strongly recommend this test for
experimental investigations involving simple intervening
variable models” (MacKinnon et al., 2002, p. 99).
The joint significance test approach suggests that one
can conclude mediation when two conditions are met: 1)
the independent variable predicts the mediator, and 2) the
mediator predicts the dependent variable, controlling for the
independent variables (MacKinnon et al., 2002). We follow
this approach here by conducting several regression
analyses. The first set of regression analyses assesses the
relationship between ethical orientation and the perceived
ethicality of misleading various stakeholders, which
addresses the first condition for mediation and Hypotheses
1 and 2. The subsequent set of regressions assesses the
relationship between perceived ethicality and individuals’
willingness to mislead the stakeholders, which addresses
the second condition for mediation and indicates whether
mediation is supported.
Results for the first step in the mediation test are shown
in Table 2. Hypothesis 1 predicted that ethical formalism
would be negatively related to individuals’ perceptions of
the ethicality of bluffing. As shown in Table 2, this
hypothesis was largely supported. After controlling for age,
gender, and citizenship, there was a significant negative
main effect for formalism on the perceived ethicality of
misleading distributors (β = -.30, p < .01), one’s company
(β = -.22, p < .05), and competitors (β = -.29, p < .01).
While in the expected direction, the relationship between
formalism and perceived ethicality of misleading customers
did not reach statistical significance (β = -.16, p = ns).

Perceived Ethicality of Bluffing
Adapted from Ross and Robertson (2000), participants
were presented with a short scenario that described the
opportunity to make a large, valuable sale. However, in
order to complete the sale, one entity (competitor,
customer, distributor, or company/employer) would need to
be provided with misleading information. On a 5-point
scale (1 = definitely unethical to 5 = definitely ethical)
participants were asked to indicate how appropriate it
would be to mislead each of the aforementioned targets.
Willingness to Bluff
Using the same scenario reported above, participants
were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale (1 = absolutely no
chance to 5 = definitely willing) whether they would be
willing to mislead the competitor, customer, distributor, or
their company, in order to make the sale.
Controls
Prior research indicates that individuals’ interpretations
of and reactions to ethical dilemmas is influenced by a
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TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations
Variable
1. Age
2. Gender
3. Citizenship
4. Ethicality
Company
5. Ethicality
Distributor
6. Ethicality
Customer
7. Ethicality
Competitor
8. Willingness
Distributor
9. Willingness
Competitor
10. Willingness
Company
11. Willingness
Customer
12. Formalism
13. Utilitarianism
n = 107
* p < .05
** p < .01

Mean

s.d.

1

2

3

4

26.54
0.55
0.11

6.10
0.50
0.31

.14
.07

-.03

1.43

0.92

-.06

-.20*

.11

1.72

0.98

-.09

-.16

.11

.69**

1.46

0.92

-.14

-.14

.02

.27**

.49**

2.65

1.35

-.08

-.18

.09

.24**

.56**

.47**

2.01

1.03

-.07

-.19*

.02

.36**

.65**

.31**

.49**

3.15

1.46

-.13

-.23*

.07

.39**

.56**

.44**

.67**

.65**

1.51

0.84

-.03

-.24*

.03

.64**

.51**

.28**

.26**

46**

.32**

1.74
4.47
4.00

0.98
0.45
0.59

-.15
.09
.00

-.15
27**
.04

.12
.05
-.10

.34**
-.19*
.01

.52**
-.24*
.01

.69**
-.18
-.06

.49**
-.18
.12

46**
-34**
.05

.49**
-.15
.10

Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive relationship between
utilitarianism and individuals’ perceptions of the ethicality
of bluffing. The results depicted in Table 2 supported this
hypothesis for two of the four targets as reflected by the
significant relationship between utilitarianism and the
perceived ethicality of misleading distributors (β = .14, p <

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

.51**
-25**
.04

-.12
.07

.47**

.10) and competitors (β = .24, p < .05). As with formalism,
results were in the expected direction; however, the
relationship between utilitarianism and perceived ethicality
of misleading one’s company (β = .10, p = ns) and
customers (β = .00, p = ns) did not reach a meaningful level
of significance.

TABLE 2
Regression Analysis: Ethical Orientation on Perceived Ethicality of Bluffing Stakeholders
Dependent Variable:
Constant
Age
Gender
Citizenship
Formalism
Utilitarianism

Ethicality of Bluffing
Distributors
Model 1
Model 2
-.08
-.15
.11

-.06
-.07
.14
-.30**
.14†

Ethicality of Bluffing
Company
Model 1
Model 2

Ethicality of Bluffing
Competitors
Model 1
Model 2

Ethicality of Bluffing
Customers
Model 1
Model 2

-.04
-.19*
.10

-.03
-.14
.13
-.22*
.10

-.06
-.18
.09

-.05
-.10
.13
-.29**
.24*

-.12
-.13
.02

-.11
-.09
.03
-.16
.00

.01
Adjusted R2
.06
.02
Model F
1.44
2.39*
1.82
n = 107. Standardized regression coefficients are shown
† p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01

.04
1.88†

.02
1.64

.08
2.75*

.01
1.20

.01
1.21

The next set of analyses tests the second step for
mediation and examines Hypothesis 3, which predicted that
perceived ethicality would mediate the relationship between
participants’ ethical orientation and their willingness to
bluff. Table 3 displays the results of this analysis. These

results largely support our third hypothesis. As expected,
the perceived ethicality of misleading stakeholders
significantly predicts individuals’ willingness to mislead
distributors (β = .55, p < .001) and competitors (β = .68, p <
.001). Also as expected, there is a significantly positive
15
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relationship between the extent to which participants’
believe misleading their company or customers is ethical
and their reported willingness to mislead their company (β
= .59, p < .001) or customers (β = .67, p < .001)
respectively. However, inasmuch as formalism was not
significantly related to the ethicality of misleading
customers and utilitarianism did not significantly influence
the perceived ethicality of misleading customers or one’s
company we can not conclude that perceived ethicality
mediates these two stakeholder relationships. In sum, the

results support Hypothesis 3 for two of our targets. The
perceived ethicality of bluffing distributors and customers
mediates the relationship between ethical orientation and
individuals’ willingness to bluff those targets. In contrast,
the results partially support Hypothesis 3 as it relates to
customers and one’s company. The perceived ethicality of
bluffing customers and one’s company affects individuals’
willingness to bluff these targets but does not mediate
between ethical orientation and bluffing behavior.

TABLE 3
Regression Analysis: Perceived Ethicality on Willingness to Bluff Stakeholders
Dependent Variable:

Willingness to Bluff
Distributors
Model 1
Model 2

Willingness to Bluff
Company
Model 1
Model 2

Constant
Age
-.03
.01
.02
Gender
-.04
.01
-.17†
Citizenship
.09
-.01
.05
Formalism
-.39**
-.20*
-.29**
Utilitarianism
.26*
.17*
.15
Distributor Ethicality
.55**
Company Ethicality
Competitor Ethicality
Customer Ethicality
Adjusted R2
.11
.50
.08
Model F
3.57**
18.20**
2.88*
n = 107. Standardized regression coefficients are shown
† p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01

.04
-.09
-.02
-.17†
.09

Willingness to Bluff
Competitors
Model 1
Model 2
-.11
-.14
.10
-.16
.20†

-.07
-.07
.02
.04
.04

Willingness to Bluff
Customers
Model 1
Model 2
-.13
-.07
.15
-.18
.15

-.06
-.01
.13†
-.07
.15†

.08
1.80

.67**
.51
16.83**

.59**
.68**
.42
13.23**

.05
2.09†

.47
16.09**

2008), less research considers the effect of ethical
orientation on individuals’ ethical behavior.
Extensive research on the person-situation debate in
organizational behavior provides strong evidence to suggest
that neither individual nor situational variables alone
completely account for individual behavior (Kenrick and
Funder, 1988). Rather, characteristics of the individual
interact with characteristics of the environment to
determine attitudes and behaviors. Part two of our study
therefore examines the effects of perceived ethicality as
well as the interactive effect of ethical orientation with
facets of the broader context on the degree to which
individuals’ try to bluff rivals in a competitive situation.
Figure 1 also illustrates these proposed relationships.

DISCUSSION
Consistent with our hypotheses, the first part of our
study revealed a significant relationship between
participants’ ethical orientations and their assessments of
the ethicality of bluffing a competitor, company, and
distributor. Also as expected, results indicate a significant
relationship between participants’ perception of the degree
to which engaging in a questionable practice such as
bluffing is ethical and their reported willingness to engage
in the practice. The second part of our study extends these
findings by exploring attitudes and behaviors in a
laboratory experiment.
PART 2: THEORY & HYPOTHESES

Perceived Ethicality
Although the results of our survey generally supported
our hypothesized relationships, there may be a difference
between individuals’ reported willingness to breach ethical
principles in a fictitious scenario and their willingness to do
so in an actual situation where real outcomes are tied to
their behavior. Although a growing stream of research
examines the effect of ethical orientation on individuals’
assessments of ethicality (Alder et al. 2007; Alder et al.,

As described above, ethical judgments can influence
individuals’ behaviors such that the more ethical (less
unethical) they view bluffing, the more they are willing to
engage in the behavior (Guidice et al., 2009). The theory of
reasoned action likewise indicates that attitudes impact
intentions (e.g., Ajzen and Madden, 1986; Albarracin et al.,
2001; Flannery and May, 2000; Beck and Azjen, 1991) and
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environments (D’Aveni, 1994; 1995; Zahra, 1994). These
arguments suggest that the greater the pressure or need to
perform individuals feel, the more likely they will be to
perform a potentially questionable act such as providing
competitors with misleading signals of intent.

that these attitudes and intentions precede behavior
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Studies in the negotiations
literature have similarly argued that the more individuals
regard deception as appropriate, the greater their intention
to use the tactic in negotiations (Anton, 1990; Lewicki and
Stark, 1996). Individuals’ assessments of the ethicality of
bluffing rivals in a competitive arena should therefore be
positively related to the occurrence of the behavior itself
(i.e., the extent to which they decide to actually engage in
bluffing behavior). We therefore predict the following:

Hypothesis 5a: Individuals’ felt pressure to perform
will be positively related to their efforts to bluff
competitors.
Building on the previous hypothesis, we expect ethical
formalism to moderate the pressure-bluffing behavior
relationship. For formalists, moral imperatives are without
exception. Hence, the moral imperative, “never tell a lie”.
In view of this rigidity, we would expect that the extent to
which high formalists attempt to mislead their rivals in a
competitive situation will be driven by their ethical
orientation rather than by their pressure to perform. In
contrast, we expect low formalists to be less stringent and
more flexible in their response to ethically gray areas,
including bluffing. Given such latitude in response,
considerations beyond perceived ethicality, including the
pressure to perform, may influence the behavior of low
formalists. In short, the relationship between pressure to
perform and misleading behavior will be weaker for high
formalists than for low formalists.

Hypothesis 4: Participants’ perceptions of the
ethicality of bluffing competitors will be positively
related to the extent to which they attempt to do so.
Other factors may influence decisions to engage in
questionable business practices. Indeed, some of the ethical
violations that have been documented in the press are of
such a nature that one can hardly doubt the individuals
involved knew, at least at some level, that their actions were
morally questionable. Although a myriad of factors may
explain help such behavior, we examine two here - pressure
to perform the behavior and instrumentality of the behavior.
Pressure
Researchers agree that individuals may engage in
questionable conduct in response to situational pressures
and stressful working conditions (Rest, 1984; Trevino,
1987). For example, research indicates that unethical
behavior may be associated with stressful social issues in
the workplace (Van Zyle and Lazenby, 2002), a
combination of unrealistic goals and a lack of support from
supervisors (Simms, 1992), and strict rules and regulations
(Erman, 1994). Ample anecdotal and survey evidence
similarly support this conclusion. When managers from
profile ethical scandals were asked why they implemented
decisions that were unethical, a common response was the
Nuremberg defense: “I thought this may have been wrong,
but my boss told me to do it. I was just following orders”
(Goldsmith, 2004). In the 1990s, ethical violations at
Prudential Insurance became so pervasive that the
company's management eventually estimated its liability
from the pending class-action lawsuit at $2 billion. Among
the testimony from the case was the explanation that, “Your
judgment gets clouded out in the field when you are
pressured to sell, sell, sell” (Rudin, 2007). A survey of
1,300 workers by the American Society of Chartered Life
Underwriters and Chartered Financial Consultants revealed
that nearly half of the respondents took part in unethical or
illegal activity, such as deceiving customers, as a result of
pressure (Marchetti, 1997).
In sum, pressure or the need to succeed in a
competitive environment can “force” individuals to commit
ethically questionable acts they would not have otherwise
committed. As indicated earlier, strategic scholars have
argued that bluffing is essential to success in competitive

Hypothesis 5b: Ethical formalism will moderate
the relationship between individuals’ felt pressure
to perform and their efforts to bluff competitors.
Instrumentality
A number of well established theories of motivation
suggest that individuals are motivated to do those things
that have high instrumentality (i.e., perform behaviors
which lead to desirable outcomes). For example, the basic
tenet of expectancy theory is that individuals are motivated
to do that which is they believe is possible and valuable
(Vroom, 1964). Similarly, a classic justification for
behavior is that the ends justify the means. This rationale
suggests that individuals will be more inclined to commit a
questionable act if it is instrumental in producing a
desirable outcome than if the act is not instrumental in
producing such an outcome.
Anecdotally, stories abound of managers and
employees who perform ethically questionable behaviors
with the hopes of accomplishing desirable outcomes either
for them or for the organization. The role of instrumentality
is clearly manifested in the scandal involving impeached
Illinois governor, Rod Blagojevich, and his
communications as he sought to fill the senate seat vacated
by Barack Obama. Reportedly, the governor sought
substantial monetary benefits for himself and his wife as
well as a cabinet post or ambassadorship in exchange for
his improper use of his political power. Other instances
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participants were asked a series of questions about their
thoughts and experiences in the game.

detail less blatantly fraudulent, yet questionable, behavior
done with the belief that it would prove instrumental for
other stakeholders including one’s company. In the context
of our study, this logic and case evidence suggests that
individuals, groups, and organizations will be more likely to
attempt to bluff rivals if they believe it will prove useful
and enhance their chances of “winning” the competition.

Simulation
Upon arrival to the study, participants were informed
that the purpose of the study was to better understand
decisions and behaviors in a strategic context and were
given instructions for playing a thirty-round simulated
market entry game. Specifically, at the start of each round,
the game administrator announced the carrying capacity (c)
for a newly created market, the value of which varied
randomly from round to round. Using tokens to signal their
intention to competitors, participants were asked
(simultaneously) to indicate whether or not they intended to
enter the market. After their nonverbal signals were
recorded by a second game administer, the first game
instructor then asked everyone to simultaneously reveal
their answers to a second question – whether or not they
actually entered the market.
Each participant began the game with four points extra
credit and were told that the amount of extra credit that they
would receive depended on their performance .
Performance in the game was a function of the number of
players that entered the market each round relative to the
market’s carrying capacity. Players that chose not to enter
received zero points. Those that entered a market earned
points if the number of entrants was equal to or less than the
announced carrying capacity (i.e., balanced or under
capacity). Entering participants lost points when excess
competitors entered the market relative to the market’s
carrying capacity (i.e., over capacity).
The nature of
this game allowed us to explore two key elements that were
not present in the pre-game survey. First, rather than
examine ethical perceptions and related behavioral
predispositions associated with a hypothetical situation, this
portion of our study focused on ethical judgments and
actual behavior in a real situation with tangible outcomes
linked to performance. Second, whereas in the survey the
utility of misleading stakeholders was given (the sale would
be made), the utility of bluffing in the competitive game
was open to the judgment of the participant. This
manipulation enabled us to explore the effect of perceived
usefulness of bluffing—a concept we hypothesized as a
critical determinant of the effect of utilitarianism.
Following the game, participants completed a second
survey that tapped their reactions to the game. They were
then debriefed on the purpose of the study and thanked for
their participation.

Hypothesis 6a: Participants’ beliefs in the
instrumentality of bluffing competitors will be
positively related to their efforts to do so.
Building on the previous hypothesis, we expect ethical
utilitarianism to moderate the instrumentality-bluffing
behavior relationship. Utilitarians may well recognize that a
practice has questionable moral overtones, yet their
behavioral responses may be overridden by a focus on
instrumentality. Because ethical utilitarians are concerned
primarily with results, rather than rules or processes (Brady,
1990), we expect that a strong utilitarian orientation will
further enhance the relationship between a belief in bluffing
competitors as a beneficial tactic and their inclinations to
utilize the tactic. Numerous case examples exist of decision
makers who explicitly calculated non-moral outcomes to
justify actions that were questionable from a purely moral
perspective. A classic example is the case of Ford when
producing the Pinto. In this scenario, executives quantified
the monetary gains of placing the fuel tank in a location on
the vehicle they knew would lead to accidents and deaths.
These gains were juxtaposed with assessments of the value
of life, which led to the decision to keep the fuel tank in that
questionable location.
Thus, to the extent that misleading others proves
advantageous, other considerations will exert less influence
over the behavior of high utilitarians. By contrast, low
utilitarians are less concerned with the importance of
outcomes and thus, the relationship between belief in the
instrumentality of bluffing and their actual bluffing
behavior should be less pronounced. Stated differently, the
relationship between perceived instrumentality and
misleading behavior will be stronger for high utilitarians
than for low utilitarians.
Hypothesis 6b: Ethical utilitarianism will
moderate the relationship between perceived
instrumentality and individuals’ efforts to bluff
competitors.
METHOD
This part of the investigation relied on the same
students who completed the survey used in part one of our
study. This part of the study began with a laboratory
experiment in which students competed in a simulated
market-entry game. Upon completion of the simulation,

Measures
Ethical Orientation
The relative strength of participants’ utilitarian or
formalist ethical orientations was measured on the survey
administered in part one of the study using the character
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traits version of the Measure of Ethical Viewpoints (Brady
and Wheeler, 1996).

Perceived Ethicality of Bluffing Competitors
Three items measured the extent to which participants
believed it was ethical to bluff in this competitive situation.
A sample item included, “If a player wants to be completely
ethical in this game, they should not attempt to influence
other players by giving misleading information.” Principal
components analysis with varimax rotation supported a
single dimension, with one factor explaining 57.7% of the
variance. Cronbach’s alpha for this newly created measure
was .63.

Pressure to Perform
Participants’ felt need to do well in the game was
measured with three items developed for this study. A
sample item included, “I wanted to do well in this game
because the extra credit was important to me.” Principal
components analysis with varimax rotation was conducted
to determine the factor structure. As expected, items loaded
on one factor to explain 59.6% of the variance. Cronbach’s
alpha for this newly created measure was .66.

Bluffing Behavior
The extent to which participants’ attempted to mislead
their competitors was assessed with three items. Principal
components analysis with varimax rotation supported a
single dimension, with the one factor explaining 72.9% of
the variance. Cronbach’s alpha for this newly created
measure was .81. A sample item included, “In general, I
only signaled that I intended to enter a market if I really
intended to do so.”

Instrumentality
We developed a three item measure to assess each
participant’s belief that bluffing competitors was a useful
tactic in the game. As expected, items loaded on one factor;
however, the inter-item correlation of one item was below
the minimum benchmark .40 (Nunnally, 1978) and
therefore, was removed. The remaining factor structure
explained 77.6% of the variance and had a Cronbach’s
alpha of .71. Using a 5 point scale (1 = strongly disagree to
5 = strongly agree), the two items used in the analyses were
“Deception can help players succeed in this game” and
“Players who hide their true intentions probably have a
better chance of winning than those who do not hide their
intentions”.

RESULTS
Table 4 presents means, standard deviations, and
intercorrelations for all variables in the second part of the
study. As before, we controlled for age, gender, and
citizenship in all analyses.

TABLE 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations
Variable
1. Age
2. Gender
3. Citizenship
4. Bluffing Behavior
5. Perceived
Ethicality
6. Pressure to
Perform
7. Instrumentality
8. Formalism
9. Utilitarianism
n = 107
* p < .05
** p < .01

Mean

s.d.

1

2

3

26.54
0.55
0.11
2.92
3.20

6.10
0.50
0.31
1.02
0.89

.14
.09
.17
.07

-.07
.01
-.07

-.04
-.10

3.92

0.77

-.16

.06

3.12
4.47
4.00

0.92
0.45
0.59

-.05
.09
.00

-.03
.27**
.04

We tested our hypotheses with a series of regression
analyses. To mitigate multicollinearity concerns, we mean
centered the independent variables prior to creating
interaction terms and running the regression analyses
(Aiken and West, 1991).

4

5

.01

.30**
.04

-.23*

.12
.05
-.10

.33**
.05
.02

-.15
-.11
-.11

6

7

8

.40**
.36**
.44**

.00
.08

.47**

Hypothesis 4 predicted a positive relationship between
participants’ perceptions of the ethicality of misleading
competitors and their bluffing behavior. As shown in Table
5, this hypothesis was supported, reflected by the
significant relationship between perceived ethicality and
bluffing behavior (β = .29, p <.01).
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TABLE 5
Regression Analysis: Perceived Ethicality on Bluffing Behavior
Dependent Variable:
Bluffing Behavior
Constant
Age
Gender
Citizenship
Ethicality
Adjusted R2
Model F

Model 1:
Controls

Model 2:
Direct Effects

.17†
-.01
-.05

.15
.01
-.02
.29**

.00
1.09

.08
3.20*

n = 107. Standardized regression coefficients are shown
† p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01

As shown in Table 6, results failed to support
Hypothesis 5a as the relationship between pressure to
perform and bluffing behavior was not significant (β = -.08,
p = ns). However, as predicted by hypothesis 5b, there was

a significant interaction between formalism and pressure (β
= .17, p<.05). Thus, it appears that pressure does influence
bluffing behavior; however, its effect is completely
moderated by formalist orientation.

TABLE 6
Indirect Effects of Ethical Orientation on Bluffing Behavior
Dependent Variable:
Performance (Points in a Round)
Constant
Age
Gender
Citizenship
Pressure to Perform
Instrumentality
Formalism
Utilitarianism
Pressure x Formalism
Instrumentality x Utilitarianism
Adjusted R2
Model F

Model 1:
Controls

Model 2:
Direct Effects

Model 3:
Interaction

.17†
-.01
-.05

.18†
-.00
-.10
-.08
.38**

.15
-.02
-.12
-.14
.42**
.15
-.00
.17*
.16†

.00
1.09

.11
3.76**

.13
2.71**

n = 107. Standardized regression coefficients are shown
† p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01

Hypothesis 6a predicted that participants’ beliefs in the
instrumentality of misleading competitors would be
positively related to their bluffing behavior. As seen in
Table 6, a significant relationship between perceptions of
instrumentality and bluffing behavior emerged providing
support for this hypothesis (β = .38, p<.01). The results also
provide support for Hypothesis 6b as utilitarianism
interacted with perceived instrumentality to affect bluffing
behavior (β = .16, p<.10). That is, the relationship between

instrumentality and bluffing is stronger for high utilitarians
and weaker for low utilitarians.
DISCUSSION
The results of this part of our study indicate that
perceived ethicality significantly affects individuals’
bluffing behavior in an actual competitive environment
with tangible outcomes associated with performance.
Findings also show that ethical orientation indirectly
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Our findings indicate that individual differences,
specifically ethical predispositions, influence how people
perceive bluffing when targeted at select organizational
stakeholders. Results further indicate that formalist and
utilitarian orientations interact with contextual factors to
help explain individuals’ bluffing attitudes, intentions, and
behavior. A complete understanding of the ethical
implications of bluffing therefore requires that research
consider individual difference variables in addition to
features of the environment both within and beyond the
organization.
Practically speaking, it would behoove managers
charged with overseeing company ethics and compliance
activities to consider the individuals involved as well as the
programs themselves. Awareness of potential differences
may help practitioners implement, communicate, and train
ethics programs in ways that generate optimal response.
Managers can then use knowledge of individual differences
to tailor their communications regarding the company’s
ethical values and expectations with individual employees.
For example, in our study, high utilitarians were concerned
with instrumentality and outcomes. This suggests that
managers may enhance utilitarians’ acceptance of ethics
training to the extent the program focuses on outcomes and
consequences as opposed to moral rules. In contrast, our
findings suggest that such communication may do little to
enhance acceptance among high formalists. Ethics training
among formalists may be more effective to the extent that
emphasis is placed on moral principles vis-à-vis outcomes
and consequences. Clearly, elements of both outcomes and
morality may be present in many ethics-related
communications and training programs, yet the emphasis
they receive in communications with employees may vary
as a function of their ethical orientation.
Consideration of the organization’s ethical values and
industry standards may also be an essential starting point to
improving our understanding of not only bluffing in
business but also what type of individual will best fit in the
organization. At some level, deceptive signaling reaches a
level of gravity where it may be considered unethical in any
organization. Frequently, however, the degree of ethicality
may be indeterminate and somewhat industry dependent. In
such cases, organizations must clearly identify and define
their values and tolerance levels. If some degree of bluffing
is an accepted industry norm and is encouraged by the
organization, then high utilitarians may be a more
appropriate fit than high formalists who may be
uncomfortable engaging in such practices. This fit,
interestingly, will also entail an element of risk for the
organization as high utilitarians not only reported a greater
willingness to engage in competitive bluffing but also
indicated a greater willingness to mislead their own
company.
As with all research, this study has its limitations. Most
notably, we measured perceptions of ethicality, pressure,
and instrumentality as well as bluffing behavior within the

influences individuals’ bluffing behavior toward
competitors, with formalism moderating the relationship
between instrumentality and bluffing.
Contrary to our predictions, we did not find a main
effect for pressure to perform on bluffing behavior like we
did with instrumentality. The lack of significance was
surprising as one would expect that the greater the pressure
felt, the more inclined individuals would be to strive for
higher performance by possibly engaging in questionable
behaviors. It appears, however, that other factors may
mitigate this relationship, including perhaps the perceived
risk of the behavior. It may be that as participants felt
pressure to do well, they simultaneously feared that bluffing
might result in retribution from other players which would
hurt their chances to do well in the game. This reasoning
could negate the tendency for high-pressured individuals to
engage in bluffing. Most notable, however, is the finding
that pressure exerted an influence on bluffing behavior, but
that influence was moderated by ethical formalism. This
pattern of results further magnifies the importance of ethical
orientation, as formalism may blunt the otherwise powerful
force pressure can have on individual behavior.
CONCLUSION
As a whole, the results of this study offer important
contributions to both research and practice. Ethical
dilemmas often involve misconduct and deception of one
form or another. Interpretations of these acts may not be
black or white, but rather fall in a gray area and depend on a
number of contingencies. In fact, philosophical debate over
the ethicality of bluffing engenders little agreement. While
this debate is important, the literature is devoid of research
examining the role individual differences with regards to
the ethicality of bluffing in business. Our research moves
the discussion forward by asking first, whether ethical
orientation helps predict different views on the practice of
bluffing and second, how those views influence individuals’
willingness to bluff and subsequent bluffing behavior in a
competitive context. The majority of our results suggest
that the answer is yes to both questions. Indeed, it is
reasonable to expect that individuals interpret, apply, and
balance ethical norms in different ways in light of their own
values and life experiences. Insights gleaned from the
person-situation debate also indicate that behavior results
from both environmental and individual causes.
The two-part study reported here therefore begins to
fill an important gap in the literature by providing one
explanation for questionable behavior. Consistent with
previous research, our results indicated that formalism and
utilitarianism are two independent dimensions of
individuals’ ethical orientation (Brady and Wheeler, 1996;
Schminke and Wells, 1999). Correspondingly, both have
the ability to exert important influences on ethical
judgments and behaviors; however, they do so through
divergent avenues and in concert with different constructs.
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of the relationship between individuals’ ethical orientation
and their resultant ethical behavior.
We are optimistic that these ideas as well as the
implications of our findings will spark interest in others to
take research on the issue of bluffing in business in new and
unique directions. Research along these lines will expand
our understanding of bluffing behavior including the effects
of individual differences on bluffing in business.
Ultimately, we are hopeful that this stream of research will
enhance our understanding not only of bluffing behavior,
but also of the relationship between individuals’ ethical
orientation and their attitudes and behaviors when dealing
with an ever increasing assortment of ethical gray areas
brought on by today’s changing business environment.

same post-game survey thereby raising the issue of
common method variance. We believe this concern is
mitigated some by the fact that ethical orientation was
measured on a separate pre-game survey. Our factor
analyses similarly alleviate some of this concern as results
indicated that participants distinguished between the
constructs. Nonetheless, future research should attempt to
assess these variables with different instruments.
Relatedly, our study is limited by the use of self-reports
to measure both the individuals’ ethical views on and stated
willingness to mislead important organizational
stakeholders in the first part of the study. This
methodological approach, however, corresponds to that
used in prior research interested in the relationship between
attitudes, intentions, and behavior (e.g., Ajzen and Madden,
1986; Flannery and May, 2000; Beck and Azjen, 1991).
Moreover, the objective of the hypothesis in which this data
applied was not to differentiate between individuals’
attitudes and intentions per se, but rather (as demonstrated
in the first part of the study) to examine whether their
attitudes and intentions differed as a function of the target
of the bluff and how this was related to individuals’ ethical
orientation.
Our sample size might also be viewed as a limitation.
Thus, while the size was acceptable for the number of
predictor variables considered, our results would likely
have benefited from the statistical power that accompanies
larger samples (Cohen and Cohen, 1975). It is plausible
that with a larger sample size all or more relationships
would have been statistically significant.
Finally, the cross-sectional nature of our data collection
does not permit us to thoroughly explore some of the causal
links suggested by the hypotheses. Using a longitudinal
format, future research might for instance, be able to
examine how signalers’ reputation impacts bluffing action
and response in a competitive context.
This study suggests several potential avenues for future
research efforts. First, we examined only the role of
individuals’ ethical orientation. Additional individual
difference variables, such as stage of moral development or
Machiavellianism, may influence beliefs about bluffing as
well as willingness and actual bluffing behavior. Future
research should examine these possibilities. Second, future
research is needed to explore the effects of other contextual
variables on the observed relationships. Above, we
suggested that the perceived risks of bluffing might
partially account for the lack of a significant main effect for
pressure to perform on bluffing behavior. Although we did
not measure perceived risk, future research could explore
this possibility.
Finally, future research that considers the relationships
between corporate ethics policies and programs and ethical
orientation should prove insightful. It may well be that the
effectiveness of different policies and programs might be
moderated by ethical orientation. Similarly, the approach
organizations take to ethics might well serve as a moderator
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